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    Cha - Language, Conceptualization and Awakening - JCRT 2.3

    Language, Conceptualization and Awakening: On the Paradox of Discourse in Classical Indian Yogacara

    John Y. Cha
    Gustavus Adolphus College

    1. Proem

    The following essay attempts to do two things: it seeks to analyze Indian Buddhist (Yogacara) understandings of the relation between language (doctrine) and reality (Suchness), and relate this analysis to contemporary issues. This is a tall order, one perhaps a bit too tall for a single paper. Hence, the second part is unavoidably (too) brief: the only issue broached is the difficulty and importance of comparative analysis between the proverbial “East” and “West”. One the other hand, the first attempt is carried out through an analysis of Yogacara philosophy and its embeddedness in classical Indian intellectual culture (approximately 500 BCE to 500 CE). However, one consequence of the heightened state of specialization (endemic not only to academia but also to most “technologized” cultures) is that discourse is becoming increasingly narrowed; therefore, my analysis is unavoidably focused on one school of Buddhist thought whose texts were composed between the fourth and sixth centuries of the Common Era. Therefore, a large portion of this essay is of necessity technical, in some cases more suited for those who specialize in Buddhist Studies. But all is not lost, despite the extremes of generality and specialization herein. For we find in the intellectual culture of classical India an extreme form of privileging theory over practice, a conscious effort throughout the period to construct what we would call nowadays a metanarrative. And, on the basis of a close reading of their texts I conclude that Yogacara thinkers ‘occasioned’ modes of thought that would have seemed to subvert, if only potentially or ideally, the strict hierarchy of theory over practice. Now, it is not my contention that Yogacara thinkers consciously engaged in a type of deconstruction. However, if some layers of ‘subversive occasioning’ lie in texts whose times, places and situations are far removed from our own, then that is in itself good enough reason to begin digging.

    2. Introduction

    3. The Shastric Context of Buddhist Discourse

    Cultural knowledge is transcendent in origin, and its authority is therefore unimpeachable. Since this knowledge is always already revealed to human beings via sastra their mastery of the practices inscribed therein is a function of conformity to the preexistent paradigm. Thus the process of amelioration conceived of as “progress” in the post- Enlightenment West is here instead “regression” to the normative divine model; what is there viewed as “discovery” is here in essence nothing but recovery.[1]

    4.0. Yogacara: Text/Ontology

    4.1. Reversals: Immanence/Transcendence

    4.2. Being/Non-Being

    Non-being [means] that this verbal designation of “form” up to the verbal designation of “nirvana” is without an objective basis, that is, it is without characterization, that the basis of verbal designation is completely non-existent, that is, completely absent. Verbal designation functions without relying on any existing thing. This is called non-being.[2]

    And also, whosoever negates the locus for the characteristic of verbal designation, which is the basis for the characteristic of verbal designation, completely negates the object that is the ineffable, ultimately real existence. [Thus the nihilist states]: “everything is completely non-existent.”[3]

    Anything posited as the self-nature (svabhava) of verbal designation (prajnaptivada)’ [Indeed], the self-nature of the factors of existence (dharma) is the “referent” of verbal designation, and it is called “being” by the worldly.[^14]

    And whosoever attaches to the own-nature of the verbal designation for factors of existence, i.e., the specific characteristic of form, etc., [does so] because of the postulation of existence upon that which does not exist.[4]

    Unreal mental construction exists; in that [unreal mental construction] duality does not exist (1ab).

    But here [in unreal mental construction] emptiness exists; that [unreal mental construction] too exists in that [emptiness] (1cd).[5]

    Some maintain that all factors of existence are completely without self-nature, just like the horns of a rabbit. For that reason, in order to counter the negation of all things (sarvapavada) [Maitreya] said,
    Unreal mental construction exists (1a);
    “in-itself” (svabhavatas) should be added. [The opponent objects:] Is it not the case that this assertion contradicts scripture, because it is said in scripture that “all factors of existence are empty”? [We respond:] There is no contradiction because [it is further stated that]
    in that [unreal mental construction] duality does not exist. (1b)
    Indeed, unreal mental construction which is devoid of the [duality] of any entity of subject and object of cognition, is called “empty” but not completely without self-nature.[6]

    Or, in order to counter the view, “visual form, etc., exist as real entities apart from mind and mental functions”, [Maitreya] stated
    Unreal mental construction exists (1a);
    “as a real entity” [should be added]. Visual form does not exist separated from that [consciousness]. Why? Since,
    in that [unreal mental construction] duality does not exist (1b)
    Indeed, unreal mental construction is neither the perceiver of something nor is it perceived by anything. However, [unreal mental construction] as the absence of the subject and object of perception is the sole reality (bhavamatra).[7]

    4.3. The Presence of Absence

    But here [in unreal mental construction] emptiness exists; that [unreal mental construction] too exists in that [emptiness].

    4.4. Primacy of the Text and Ontological Dependency

    [A designation] is neither the essential nature of that dharma, nor is it wholly other than that. That [essential nature] is neither the sphere of speech nor the object of speech; nor is it altogether different from these. That being the case, the essential nature of dharmas is not found in the way in which it is expressed. But further, neither is absolutely nothing found. Again, the essential nature is absent and yet not absolutely absent.[^23]

    And also, whosoever negates the locus for the characteristic of verbal designation, which is the basis for the characteristic of verbal designation, completely negates the object that is the ineffable, ultimately real existence.[8]

    5. Conclusion

    Notes

    abhutaparikalpo sti
    [iti] svabhavata iti vakyasesah / nanv evam. su4travirodhah sarvadharmah sunya iti sutre vacanat / nasti virodhah yasmad
    dvayam. tatra na vidyate /
    abhutaparikalpo sti
    [iti sa evasti] dravyatah / nasti rupam. tadvyatiriktam. [nasti] dravyata iti / kim. karanam yasmad
    dvayam tatra na vidyate

    John Y. Cha (Ph D Northwestern University), is an Assistant Professor of Religion at Gustavus Adolphus College in Minnesota. He specializes in classical Indian Buddhist philosophy focusing on the Yogacara and Madhyamika schools. His other interests include modern Japanese philosophy (Kyoto School), comparative philosophy and phenomenology.

    Copyright © held by the author(s). 2001 John Y. Cha. All rights reserved.
    Updated 07/28/21.
    jcrt.org/archives/02.3/cha

    1. In this paper I will discuss this metaphysical derivation (from reality to language) and signification (from language to reality) found in the (textually inscribed) discourse of classical Indian Yogacara. I will begin with an (all too brief) analysis of the embeddedness of Yogacara doctrine in the intellectual culture of classical India, focusing on the literary genre of sastra. Next, I analyze the contents (philosophical strategies) of select Yogacara texts–specifically those concerned with ontology and epistemology. It is here that we will detect reversals of some fundamental notions found in classical Indian/Buddhist theory. It is these reversals, I will argue, that disclose 1) an “ontological paradox”, namely, that absence discloses presence, and 2) a linguistically dependent ontology. I will conclude this paper with some general remarks about the relevance of our analysis of the above ontological paradox/dependency to contemporary postmodern issues. What I want to suggest in a preliminary way is that the implicit an-archic[^2] themes found in Yogacara thought have their parallels with some issues in postmodern discourse. ↩︎

    2. The clarification of the cultural context of Indian Buddhist discourse, namely the primacy of theory (sastra) over practice (prayoga) sheds light on some general aspects of the relation between language and awakening in Yogacara thought. However, a closer look at Yogacara philosophical discourse reveals some paradoxes in the language/reality relation. Specifically, the concepts of transcendence and immanence as they pertain to ontological and epistemological notions in the texts under consideration reverse commonly held ideas both in the pan-Indian intellectual context as well as Western thought in general. Moreover, the discursive strategies employed in the Yogacara texts’specifically, “navigating” the middle path’disclose another paradox in the relation between language and Suchness; namely, a kind of linguistically, or textually, dependent ontology. The aspects of discursive mediation and embodied locus discussed above provide a conceptual space for clarifying specific Yogacara interpretations of the pan-Indian understanding of the language/reality relation. ↩︎

    3. The philosophical content of the texts under consideration involves questions concerning the ontological and epistemological relations between linguistic/conceptual constructions and their non- or pre-constructed foundation. Contrary to some previous analyses of the Yogacara notion of reality, this analysis does not entail the mere clarification of some metaphysical source for these illusion-enhancing activities.[10] Rather, it proceeds with an investigation of the intersection, or more accurately, the ‘mutual inherency’ of the epistemological and ontological realms and takes into account both the general strategy of philosophizing employed by Yogacara intellectuals and the resulting ontological paradox of their thought; namely, that absence discloses presence. What this paradox entails will unfold throughout my investigation. Here I begin with a (brief) discussion of epistemology’in this context defined primarily in terms of illusion construction’and ontology’defined in foundational terms with respect to language and conceptualization. ↩︎

    4. Issues concerning ontology and epistemology in the Yogacara context revolve around the question of the ontological status of both consciousness (vijnana) and the objects of consciousness (vijneya). Yogacara intellectuals describe three possible answers to the question, “what, if anything, exists?” 1) the objects of consciousness, like consciousness itself, exist as independent realities; 2) consciousness and the objects of consciousness are merely conventional designations and therefore are non-existent; 3) the objects of consciousness do not exist, but consciousness does. Of these three possibilities, the Yogacara argue for the third, that consciousness is the sole existence.[^9] Before discussing the specific Yogacara arguments for this view a brief discussion of the epistemological and ontological spheres is in order. ↩︎

    5. Abhutaparikalo sti dvayam. tatra na vidyate/ ↩︎

    6. ke cid virundhanti sarvadharmah sarvatha nihsvabhavah sasavisanavad ity atah sarvapavadapratisedhartham aha ↩︎

    7. atha va cittacaittebhyo nyatra rupadayo dravyatvena santiti yesam darsanam tatpratisedhartham aha ↩︎

    8. The erroneous view of “being”, on the other hand, is one of postulating a mode of existence upon phenomena that are in actuality non-existent. It is a na’ve realism that admits of the ontological existence of linguistic referents; in other words, designations such as “visible objects” correspond to actually existing objects. Again citing from the Bodhisattvabhumi Asanga defines “being” as: ↩︎

    9. A fundamental assumption found in the authoritative texts of classical Indian Yogacara is the view that language and conceptualization possess certain illusion-enhancing activities that must be systematically counteracted and gradually overcome. Indeed, many Yogacara technical terms that describe the nature of reality and veridical perception’for example, ineffability (anabhilapya) and non-conceptual awareness (nirvikalpajnana)'strongly implicate linguistic and conceptual constructions in obstructing the direct comprehension of Suchness (tathata). However, contrary to this negative view of language and conceptualization is the equally important assumption that accurate doctrinal discourse and correct conceptual understanding are indispensable conditions for the eventual attainment of awakening. Indeed, that Buddhist thinkers in classical India utilized their doctrinal texts (including commentaries and sub-commentaries) for pedagogical, explanatory and soteriological ends attests to the fact that intellectual formation was an indispensable aspect of Buddhist religious practice.[^1] Moreover, these doctrinal and philosophical discourses were believed to disclose a reality (Suchness) that lay beyond linguistic and conceptual construction and that this reality, in turn, was taken to be foundational in the sense that all doctrine was ultimately derivative of Suchness. For the Yogacara then, language and conceptualization were inextricably bound to this ineffable and non-conceptual reality in a circular system of metaphysical derivation and signification. ↩︎

    10. Before discussing the specifics of Yogacara doctrine, it is important to contextualize these doctrinal/philosophical treatises within the larger intellectual culture of classical India. Buddhist treatises of the kind I discuss here can be classified under the broad genre category of sastra.[^3] Like other central concepts of Indian intellectual history, sastra is a polyvalent term; among other definitions it includes the notion of philosophical treatise. A discussion of the historical development and variety of definitions of the term sastra is beyond the scope of this paper. What is important for my purposes here is the fact that, “Theory in the classical Indian formulation is held necessarily to precede any practical instantiation.”[^4] This means that all efficacious activity (for classical India this includes all cultural practices), be it in the realm of religion, politics, sexual/aesthetic practices, etc., is by definition preceded by and grounded in codified rules and systematic treatises called “sastra.” Moreover, the authority of sastra is founded in its transcendent origins; for example, Indian mythology traces the composition of various sastric discourses to the spiritual plane, their authorship being attributed to various gods like Brahma.[9] Sheldon Pollock summarizes: ↩︎

    11. Generally speaking, Buddhist doctrinal texts in classical India were embedded in the larger cultural view of sastric primacy, hence sharing many fundamental assumptions with pan- Indian intellectual practice. Like their non-Buddhist counterparts, Buddhist _sastra_s too, find their authority in transcendent origins. As mentioned above, soteriologically efficacious activity is possible only through mastery of and conformity to these authoritative treatises. This indicates a discursive mediation (i.e., doctrine) between the state of an ordinary person (ignorance)'traditionally defined as a condition where a person’s consciousness is polluted by the two-fold defilement of emotional and cognitive obscurations (klesa-jneya-avarana)'and the state of an awakened one, whose consciousness is purified of these two kinds of obscurations. Furthermore, mastery and conformity (via gradated practices) guarantee the eventual attainment of awakening (possibly over many lifetimes) precisely because these Buddhist _sastra_s ultimately originate from that reality toward which the practitioner is oriented. The required placement of a doctrinally authoritative text(s) between ignorance and awakening in the process of spiritual practice implies another mediating structure; namely, an embodied locus for awakening (a Buddha or an advanced bodhisattva) between language (doctrinal discourse) and reality (Suchness). Again, reflecting the larger cultural assumptions regarding sastric discourse, the authority vested in these doctrinal texts rests upon the spiritual attainment of a text’s author. In other words, just like sastra, Buddhist doctrine ultimately finds its origin and legitimation in a transcendent reality, though via a person of spiritual status.[^7] ↩︎

    12. This reversal of the immanence/transcendence and ontological/epistemological relation, the reversal being stated as the ontological immanence and epistemological transcendence of reality, is disclosed by a kind of dialectic of affirmation, negation and again affirmation, typical of Yogacara philosophical strategy. This strategy attempts to reveal that Suchness, paradoxically, is immanent within the sphere of language and cognition while at the same time transcends these very same linguistic and conceptual spheres. What is ultimately affirmed in this paradoxical relation is the middle path (madhyama pratipat) between the extreme (and erroneous) views of being and non-being. The Yogacara explain these views in the following manner: The erroneous view of “non-being” on the one hand, is the denial of all modes of existence whatsoever. Language and conceptualization, therefore, operate within their own realm without reference to anything other than linguistic and conceptual constructs. In the Bodhisattvabhumi it is explained that ↩︎

    13. The Yogacara also have a technical term for non-being, apavada, which simply means the view that nothing whatsoever exists. Asanga defines apavada in the following way: ↩︎