INTRODUCTION

Utilizing the theoretical framework of philosopher Alain Badiou, this essay will examine the force and movement of religiously fueled, revolutionary politics. Pairing Badiou’s definition of event with the theological concept of miracle, put forward by Carl Schmitt, allows Badiou’s project a broader trajectory. The theological concept of miracle radicalizes Alain Badiou’s definition of event by manner of divine authorization. While Schmitt uses miracle to explicate the sovereign preservation of the State, and Badiou’s interest lies in its erosion, reading both thinkers through miracle, and through each other, conceptualizes the theo-political militant, authorized by an event to interrupt orders and enact new law. This concurrent reading explains the manner by which a recitation given to Muhammad, or the resurrection of an executed messiah, become events propelling political militants throughout history and across headlines.

In the wake of happenings like the Iranian revolution and the destruction of the Two Towers in Manhattan, rich and complex forays have been made into thinking about religion. Bruce Lincoln, in his work, Holy Terrors, recognizes the manner by which religious ideology often maintains order and protects the status quo. Yet this definition alone is inadequate. Lincoln goes on to say that when conditions become sufficiently abject, religion functions as a force of resistance. While defiance takes diverse forms, it reflects, in Lincoln’s words, “a radically different mode of being... expected in the immediate future.”

Olivier Roy discusses the transnational trajectory of religion through a detailed analysis of religious fundamentalism, de-contextualization, and globalization. In Holy Ignorance, Roy describes the reformulation of religion into ‘free-floating’ signs circulated through global networks with universal appeal. While Lincoln grasps the potential for religious revolt and Roy recognizes its unbounded reach, I argue that both of these capabilities originate in a religion’s evental origins.

This essay joins the complex discussion by arguing that Badiou’s event must be thought through miracle in order to elucidate the authorization of religious insurgency. The first chapter begins with an analysis of Badiou’s event, politics, and militant fidelity. Harnessing Badiou’s framework, I critique ‘what is not counted,’ as demonstrated in his recent work Rebirth of History. The second chapter will discuss Carl Schmitt’s sovereign and its link to the theological concept of miracle. The chapter will demonstrate miracle’s conceptual similarity to event, excepting that, within its interruption, resides the inauguration of

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2 Oliver Roy, Holy Ignorance. (New York: University of Columbia Press, 2010), 5.
divine authorization. Harnessing Carl Schmitt’s discussion of miracle, I return to Badiou’s own system and what it disallows, suggesting that the re-appropriation of miracle strengthens and radicalizes his project, explaining the evental authorization of theo-political militancy. The final chapter will examine the case study of Sayyid Qutb, the early ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood, to exemplify that Badiou’s framework bolstered by the theological concept of miracle accounts for the diverse disruptions of national, economic, and cultural orders as well as the prescription for new possibilities.

CHAPTER I: THE EVENT AND TRUE POLITICS: BADIOU’S THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF MILITANCY

In order to understand the force and trajectory of religious insurgency and its potential to unsettle political orders, a theoretical framework that addresses the historical occurrence of rupture is needed. History does not present itself in encyclopedic volumes, bound and labeled, with a code designating section and shelving. And while it may submit to being anesthetized, dissected and classified, it does not arrive in this way. History is born from discontinuities, from inconsistencies, from punctures in powers and ideologies. To use Alain Badiou’s language, history is born of events.

Alain Badiou is sin qua non the philosopher of the event. In this historical moment, characterized by riots, resistances and uprisings – unruly occupiers of Wall Street, the 2011 clashes in London, a sequence of revolutions called ‘Arab Spring’ – a philosophy of event appears most necessary. This chapter provides an overview of Alain Badiou’s project, specifically explicating his understanding of event, politics, and militancy. Badiou systematically places events, and the subsequent procedures they generate under four broad categories: art, science, politics, and love. While the central concern of the following section will be the theoretical structure for revolutionary politics, it is also necessary to examine Badiou’s overarching philosophical scheme and further, what he absents from these categories.

TRUE POLITICS AND THE MILITANT SUBJECT

For Badiou, being is essentially and infinitely multiple, and presents itself through a movement of assimilation. This structuring movement gathers situations into thinkable ‘sets’. Badiou terms this operational function ‘count-as-one.’ As Badiou famously puts it, “There is no one, only the count-as-one.”

Every situation is inconsistent by a ‘no-thing’ that escapes the count. The situational disruption and unpresentation caused by the ‘non-one’ may be termed event. The event is a hole in situational facticity through which a truth is subtracted. The truth is a generic procedure, propelled from that singular point with universal trajectory. Subjects holding fidelity to the event unfold its process. Thus, the inauguration of the new within being can be defined as a localized rupture, evacuating a truth, evidenced by subjective fidelity to it. Badiou groups all generic procedures of truth into four categories: art, science, politics, and love.

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For this particular article, the import of Badiou’s articulation of the event only finds its grounding within revolutionary politics. In the same way that truth voids static structures of knowledge, true politics disrupts the State. Politics is revolution. Badiou’s politics capsizes governing structures through its proclamation of equality. Yet in defining politics solely as the dissolution of sovereignty, and the militant subject as an a-substantial fragment caught in a tidal wave of ‘truth,’ Badiou problematizes his own project. Badiou’s subject becomes diffuse in a wash of multiplicity and the revolutionary collective is made impotent by an incoherent ‘general will.’ As a result, Badiou’s theory of event provides a dynamic framework for inventive politics, but one that disappears in its own wake.

Badiou places all regimes of the ordinary – the status quo, static systems of knowledge, and the governing State – under the banner term ‘the state of the situation.’ The count-as-one operator diagnoses the laws of any State, be it a nation or the globalized regime of capital. In the same way that infinitely multiple being is folded into thinkable sets by a ‘one’ operation, so the State compounds identities and constructs a unitary political body.

Like all structured presentations, this too is vulnerable to rupture. Badiou writes, “The inception of a politics... is always located in the singularity of an event.”4 The event interrupts this localized gradient of identities by revealing a non-one that dysfunctions the count and opens up new declarations for all. As examples, Badiou offers the French Revolution of 1792, the Paris Commune of 1871, the Russian Revolution of 1917, and the Egyptian Uprising of 2011.5 The lines dividing ‘those who count’ from ‘those who count for nothing’ suddenly appear illusory. In these volatile moments, there is a new recognition of a previously indiscernible all. The limit of the State is revealed and its dissolution suddenly can be thought. While ideologies safeguard the State, true politics withers it away.

While Badiou’s politics can be described by its occurrence (here and now) and by its trajectory (universal, for all), its generative nature can only be defined as unaccountable. This act of invention occurs in the space of Badiou’s militant subject. The local collective, acting in fidelity to their evental being-together, does so beyond encyclopedic and structural knowledge. The truth is carried solely by the zeal of the militant subjects and, in Badiou’s words, “no form, constitutional or organizational, can adequately express” it.6 While this definition of true politics is consistent with Badiou’s broader philosophical framework and proposes a dynamic, and even poetic, theory for the manner by which revolution is inaugurated within being, it disappears into its own incalculability.

The problem hinges precisely on the non-term, on the no-thing. Badiou’s discernible concept of indiscernible multiplicity effectively elucidates the manner by which change ruptures reality. It further offers a strong philosophical basis for

6 Badiou, Being and Event, 354
generic equality. However, it escapes representation, forever puncturing holes in knowledge. In order to conceptualize the becoming of truths, Badiou points beyond the horizon of ‘still more’ into ‘the void.’ It is that irreducible excess that deposes the subject and promises the hope of mathematical justice. By definition Badiou’s politics escapes definition. It functions as a radical critique and a call to action, yet authorized by an ‘anonymous will’ to imagine the ‘incalculable’ gives politics no podium or platform - just an indiscernible stutter.\textsuperscript{7} What could it create and what authority is available to so? This becomes surprisingly evident in the differences posed by Badiou’s account of the Egyptian uprising and the actual political outcomes on the ground.

THE REBIRTH OF HISTORY?

Badiou’s recent work, The Rebirth of History, tackles the sequence of revolts called ‘The Arab Spring.’ Badiou uses the moment as an opportunity to defend himself against detractors who cite him as being insufficiently Marxist. Asserting his theoretical framework of a ‘generic communism,’ Badiou puts forward a critique of global capitalism, summoning the recent riots, especially those in Tahrir Square, as a sign of a more meaningful future. All the while, the text remains silent about the Muslim Brotherhood. When the dust of revolution settled, the Brotherhood had won a majority stake in nearly all of the embryonic governments. Like the official EU report that fumbled with the uncertainty of what this all meant, Badiou’s silence confesses something that his own framework failed to count.\textsuperscript{8} What does it mean that Badiou’s generic equality is surpassed by theo-political militancy?

Badiou’s grand project poses two questions regarding any structure. First, ‘what is left out?’ And second, ‘when and where will the non-term appear?’ While Badiou delicately details the ‘incalculable’ manner by which rupture produces history, his own system neatly compartmentalizes the occurrences into four ‘sets.’ His precise procedures of truth (art, science, politics, and love) succinctly trace a Western arc of history marking the key heroes and highlights along the way – Plato, the French Revolution, Communism, and Cantor. Throughout this all, Badiou champions the quality of multiplicity and its inevitable power to move history towards a rupture of rebirth. While remaining faithful to this ‘mathematical hope’ of justice, Badiou’s system fails to fully account for the authorization of another type of incalculable revolution. Is Badiou’s own narrative structure ripe for disruption by a non-term? For instance, how did the Muslim Brotherhood operate, by Badiou’s own definition, politically? Further, what enabled them to seize the political power abandoned by Egypt’s liberal left and the riotous group of Facebook revolutionaries? How did the Brotherhood garner a majority stake in the transformative agenda of, not only Egypt, but a majority of the entire sequence of ‘Arab-spring’ revolts?

\textsuperscript{7} Ibid.

This critique does not dismiss Alain Badiou’s project, but radicalizes it. Badiou’s project should be pushed farther than it is willing to go. Politics can tear apart structures, but what worlds can it build? In turning to jurist Carl Schmitt, who defined sovereign authorization by the theological concept of miracle, we see a hole through which Badiou’s own project might rupture with itself. The concept of miracle bears implicit similarity to Badiou’s theory of event, excepting that it is a Something, rather than a nothing, which interrupts reality. And it is this disruptive Something, let us say in Badiou’s own mathematical phrasing – a One, that authorizes the imagination and invention of the new.

CHAPTER II: RUPTURE AND AUTHORIZATION

The question that lies before us is, ‘What happens when a One, rather than a nothing, interrupts history?’ What does the thought ‘God intervenes in reality’ allow? The theological concept of miracle has been buried along with a bygone era of sentimentality and obfuscated by centuries of scientific discoveries. Yet, in light of Badiou’s framework it is necessary to revive it and examine the authorization under which theo-political militancy operates. While Badiou provides a provocative theory for the evental erosion of the State, his politics escapes representation. The theological concept of miracle mirrors Badiou’s event, yet provides the symbolic framework necessary to authorize and inaugurate the new within being.

This section will define miracle, demonstrate its similarity to Badiou’s event, and trace its historical disappearance as a thinkable concept. Surprisingly, the ‘resurrection’ of the concept is credited not to a theologian, but an obscure jurist writing from the midst of the Weimar republic. Political theorist Carl Schmitt recognized the theological nature of the political and applied the concept of miracle to explicate sovereignty. For Schmitt, the miraculous suspension of order elucidated the necessity of individual intervention against the disruptions of history. While Schmitt’s sovereign functions to preserve the State, Badiou’s politics revolts. By reading Badiou through Schmitt, we can begin to imagine what lies beyond event and theorize the force and movement of a religiously fueled, revolutionary politics.

THE MIRACLE AS EVENT

We are not afforded the space to detail the various definitions of miracle throughout history. The central task at hand is to ask whether a miracle may be thought of eventally, and if so, what innovation this introduces into Badiou’s system. Let us begin by defining miracle as a singular act of divine intervention. Divine power may create and uphold the natural order, but miracle signals a divine ‘breaking into.’ While Aquinas classifies miracle as occurring outside the natural order, and Hume describes it as the transgression of natural law, our central concern must be thinking of miracle as the disruption of the order and the inauguration of something new. To that end we will briefly enlist Pascal and Kierkegaard, but most importantly Badiou. Badiou himself offers the best defense of miracle’s evental nature. Yet in the same way that the concept of miracle disappeared from serious consideration in Western thought, its presence
within Badiou’s own writing is treated with conflicted sincerity and outright dismissal.

Miracle is of primary importance for the topic at hand because of its availability to be interpreted within the category of event. Like Pascal who cryptically wrote in his fragmentary Pensees, “It is not possible to have a reasonable belief against miracles,”9 the miracle interrupts situational knowledges. It is not the fodder for debate but a demand for action. Or consider Kierkegaard, who described the response to miracle as a ‘leap of faith,’ a decision beyond the regimes of reason, an absurd ‘new’ within being.10 The new ‘truth’ is not the material for logical abstraction. It is individual volition, a subjective break with universal trajectory. Yet, the best defense for miracle’s evental nature is Badiou himself. In tucking Pascal’s Pensees within his own defense of mathematical ontology, Being and Event, and in soliciting St. Paul as a revolutionary contemporary, Badiou provides a sincere, yet cautious, defense for miracle’s evental quality.

Badiou writes, regarding Pascal, “The ‘proofs of the existence of God’ were abandoned, and… the pure evental force of faith… restituted.”11 Pascal does this through an argument based upon miracles. Badiou continues, “The miracle… is the emblem of the pure event… Its function – to be in excess of proof – pinpoints and factualizes the ground from which there originates… the possibility of believing in truth.”12 This ‘excess of proof’ is the essence of Pascal’s famous wager. For Badiou, the wager has little to do with the necessity of weighing various arguments, counting costs and benefits, and electing the most reasonable choice. Quite the opposite. Confronted by the miracle, beyond bounds of rationality, all that is left for one to do is wager. One must wager.13

This fascination with miracle does not stop with Pascal. Badiou, the avowed atheist of infinite multiplicity, goes on to champion a strange hero of revolutionary politics – Saint Paul. In his text Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, Badiou revives the ancient apostle as our contemporary militant. Badiou confesses his aspirations to crush the ‘clerical infamy’ of his family tree and makes it clear from the start that the resurrection must be treated as a fable. Nevertheless, Badiou’s Paul functions as our revolutionary contemporary precisely because his politics originates from this impossible point. The singularity of the miracle ‘Jesus is resurrected’ evacuates Paul from any structural legitimization and exposes the fictions of Greek wisdom, Jewish ritual, and Roman Empire.14 Moving with a universal trajectory, Paul is able to declare, “There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female…”15 Badiou’s Paul is no philosopher, and his faith is no opinion.

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11 Badiou, Being and Event, 214.
12 Ibid., 216.
13 Ibid., 221.
15 Galatians 3.28.
The resurrection happens not as ‘proof’ of anything, but as the pure beginning of a universal proclamation.16

Badiou is primarily interested in the procedural form of Paul’s declaration. Yet, because it is Paul that is summoned as our ‘revolutionary contemporary,’ and not Mao, Marx, or Lenin, Badiou is forced to offer a sincere, yet conflicted account of miracle. At the forefront of St. Paul: The foundation of Universalism, Badiou writes:

Let us be clear: so far as we are concerned, what we are dealing with here is precisely a fable... A ‘fable’ is that part of the narrative that, so far as we are concerned, fails to touch on any Real... In this regard, it is to its element of fabulation [point de fable] alone that Paul reduces the Christian narrative, with the strength of one who knows that by holding fast to this point as real, one is unburdened of all the imaginary that surrounds it.17

While there is a beautiful turn in this statement, enlisting the fable to unpresent fictitious imaginings, ultimately, for Badiou, the miracle functions as metaphor. It fits perfectly within his framework of event, truth, and subject, excepting that it must always be a no-thing that interrupts reality. Rupture remains the infinite work of pure inconsistency. That is why in this text, as well as in his chapter on Pascal, Badiou finds it necessary to equate miracle to chance. It must occupy the undecidable space of an arbitrary ‘dice-throw.’18

So, while the concept of miracle may be thought of eventually, there remains a significant point of differentiation. Kierkegaard and Pascal recognized within miracle a divine disruption – it is a God that intervenes in reality – yet Badiou, following the mainstream of post-Enlightenment rationality, reduces miracle to chance disorder. Badiou’s eventual interpretation of miracle offers the beginnings of a theory linking the miraculous and the revolutionary, but it does not go far enough. What does this reluctance cost him? The answer is found in a jurist writing from the midst of the Weimar Republic.

THE REAPPEARANCE OF MIRACLE

The reappearance of miracle as a significant, thinkable concept can be credited to a legal theorist from reparation era Germany. Carl Schmitt’s slow rise from the tumults of the Weimar Republic to his broad notoriety among thinkers like Jacques Derrida and Giorgio Agamben can be traced to his pivotal writing on ‘political theology.’ Under a work bearing the then-novel name, Schmitt presents his case for the inseparability of the two fields. Every polis is governed by a symbolic order that bears surprising likeness to the conceptual contents of theology. Schmitt uses this general basis to ground his theory of sovereignty in the theological concept of miracle. In the same way that the miracle signals sudden divine intervention, Schmitt’s sovereign is the authorized individual

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16 Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, 49.
17 Ibid., 4.
18 Badiou, Being and Event, 216, and Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, 85.
whose action creates law ex nihilo. The sovereign symmetrically elucidates Badiou’s political militant. In reading the two together we can begin to see a framework for the authorization and efficacy of theo-political militancy.

Schmitt reintroduces the seminal notion that all political concepts are ultimately secularized theological concepts. Quoting Leibniz, Schmitt writes, “We have deservedly transferred the model of our division from theology to jurisprudence because the similarity of these two disciplines is astonishing.”19 Through both intentional application and implicit sociological structure, the polis is always governed by the theological; all significant political concepts fall somewhere on the genealogy of theological development.20 Like the contemporary political theorist Claude Lefort, who argues that a symbolic order is necessary to generate society and mediate human coexistence, Schmitt recognizes a radically systemic identity that structures the political.21 This ‘metaphysical image’ negotiates the world and allows for collective association. Understanding the transferable relationship of the two fields elucidates the prevailing identity that mediates social consciousness. After proposing this theory of correspondence, Schmitt presents a parallel arc of Western political and theological history.

Schmitt points out that the transcendent God that characterized the seventeenth- and eighteenth-centuries became manifest in a State governed by a transcendent sovereign. The nineteenth-century’s immanent God was evidenced in Rousseau’s ‘general will,’ a democratic theory of State, and the interchangeability of the terms sovereign and citizen.22 As an example, Schmitt offers the God of the French Revolution’s liberal bourgeoisie and the concurrent retention of a token monarch, disabled by ‘the people.’23 He writes, “Although the liberal bourgeoisie wanted a god, its god could not become active; it wanted a monarch, but he had to remain powerless.”24 This transmutation of the governing symbolic order became further accentuated until at last the mechanized God of the deists and the ambiguous God of the theists were both discarded. The machine could run by itself, and ‘the People’ floated pleasantly above the polis.25 In the wake of this shift Schmitt concludes, “Conceptions of transcendence will no longer be credible to most educated people.”26

Schmitt’s view that the political necessitates a symbolic order to negotiate social reality implies that any decision about whether or not something is political will always be a political decision. This includes, as he puts it, “the question whether a particular theology is a political or unpolitical theology.”27 The exclusion of

20 Ibid., 36.
22 Schmitt, Political Theology, 49.
23 Ibid., 59
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., 48.
26 Ibid., 50.
27 Ibid., 2.
transcendence was a political necessity for the sake of preserving the immanent regime of ‘the people.’ Yet, pushing God out had, in Schmitt’s mind, simultaneously paralyzed the State. The cataclysmic ruptures of history were now placed in the hands of incompetent committees, pandering politicians, and the slow, mathematical process of the vote. The political had been evacuated of force. Tapping his hammer upon the pillars of calculative democracy and the committees of general will, Schmitt found only political relativism and the absence of any decisive element. Literally no ‘one’ was there.

Schmitt recognized that this contemporaneously validated legal order, at its highest point, was only a system of norms, duplicable ascriptions and uniformities. Yet, a functioning theory of State needed to encompass more than general rules, and it could not withdraw when faced with extreme cases or exceptions. What Schmitt called ‘the power of real life’ would inevitably break through, exposing the system’s limits and confounding its structure. In regards to the State, these exceptions would prove to be unanticipated cases of ‘extreme peril,’ threatening the persistence of its order. Like Badiou’s event, the exception would not conform to law, and it is precisely this quality that drew Schmitt’s attention to ‘the whole question of sovereignty.’ While constitutional liberalism had failed to grasp the independent meaning of choice, the exception required, in Schmitt’s mind, appointing a single person to decide.

“Sovereign is he who decides on the exception,” runs Schmitt’s now-famous definition. Facing the potential dissolution of the State, the sovereign is the individual person authorized by the State to act beyond law in order to maintain its coherence. Schmitt categorizes the sovereign as a ‘borderline concept.’ The sovereign functions in the liminal space both inside of and outside of the State. By deciding firstly that an exception exists, and secondly, what will be done in regards to it, the sovereign is the licit means to enact law in a situation beyond law. The sovereign is the State exceeding itself. As Schmitt writes:

What characterizes the exception is principally unlimited authority, which means the suspension of the entire existing order. In such a situation it is clear that the state remains, where the law recedes. Because the exception is different from anarchy and chaos, order in the juristic sense still prevails even if it is not the ordinary kind.

The sovereign possesses limitless authority and is capable of suspending the entire order to preserve it. Schmitt writes elsewhere, “Authority proves that to

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29 Schmitt, Political Theology, 48.
30 Ibid., 19.
31 Ibid., 15.
32 Ibid., 8, 13
33 Ibid., 6.
34 Ibid., 1.
35 Ibid., 12.

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produce law, it need not be based on law.”36 The office is no mere construct, but the very means by which the entire system is held together.

The theological concept that links Schmitt’s definition of sovereignty to his critique of constitutional liberalism is miracle. Schmitt writes, “The exception in jurisprudence is analogous to the miracle in theology.”37 The dismissal of miracle as a thinkable concept paralleled the mechanization of government into a system of norms, generalities, and mathematical calculations. The rationalism of the Enlightenment had rejected every exception while simultaneously eliminating the ‘one’ who could suspend the political order.38 Schmitt writes, “All the tendencies of modern constitutional development point towards eliminating the sovereign.”39 And again:

This theology and metaphysics rejected not only the transgression of the laws of nature through an exception brought about by direct intervention, as found in the idea of a miracle, but also in the sovereign’s direct intervention in a valid legal order.40

The concept of miracle authorizes Schmitt to restore force to a hollow State. The miracle, as direct intervention, permits Schmitt to secure the State on a moment of individual decision. As Schmitt describes it, “A pure decision not based on reason and discussion and not justifying itself, that is... an absolute decision created out of nothingness.” 41 The State hinges on this act of situational invention. And although the sovereign verdict generates law ex nihilo, it arises not from generic chance, but from individual volition. Applying the symbolic order found in the theological concept of miracle reveals, for Schmitt, the necessity of a singular, decisive identity to preserve the State.

In reading Badiou through Schmitt we can begin to theorize the force of religiously fueled revolutionary politics. Both of Badiou’s and Schmitt’s theories are based upon the evental moment that confounds the unity and order of the rationalist scheme.42 While Schmitt’s sovereign intervenes in the exception to secure the State, Badiou’s political militant is propelled by event to revolt. Both individuals are suspended by a two-way gaze. Schmitt’s sovereign looks from the State towards the exception. Badiou’s militant looks from the event towards the new. And while Badiou proposes a compelling theory of insurrection, a politics of pure multiplicity can imagine no-thing. It possesses no identity to generate a new world.

Schmitt argues that the metaphysical image governing an epoch structures the theological and political mediation of the world. It is a generative process,
literally ordering reality. Badiou is not unaware of this. Badiou’s count-as-one operation functions in the same manner. For Badiou, every ‘one’ is a ‘unity that gathers together.’\(^{43}\) It is simultaneously limiting and productive. The ‘one’ constructs identity around itself. Further, for Badiou, every ‘one’ is *theological.*\(^{44}\) While this statement is intended to criticize and fictionalize every ‘one,’ Badiou correctly recognizes the manner by which the situational count-as-one symbolically structures being. Badiou’s politics lacks force is because it is authorized by a symbolic order of pure generality. By counting out every ‘one,’ Badiou creates a metaphysical image that can only be termed ‘void.’ The image is – meticulously, intentionally – *unpresented.*

For Schmitt, the necessity of the ‘one’ is inescapable. The ‘one’ legitimates the political, and by necessity the theological, order within social consciousness. Schmitt antithetically anticipates Badiou’s project, asserting the propensity of every *polis* to be defined by a singular identity. He points out that Hobbes had, “despite his natural-scientific approach and his reduction of the human to an atom,” reified his State as *Leviathan,* “an immense person,” and thus jumped “point-blank straight into mythology.”\(^{45}\) Further, Schmitt calls Descartes as his witness, who by doubting all things, began to reason from the thought, “The works created by several masters are not as perfect as those created by one… The best constitutions are those that are the work of a sole wise legislator, they are ‘devised by only one.’”\(^{46}\) Reading Badiou through Schmitt demonstrates that in order for an event to authorize politics – that is, containing the force to enact something new – it must be thinkable as an act of singular volition. The event must be infused with sovereignty, that is, it must be a ‘One’ that interrupts reality. It must be *miracle.* The direct intervention of miracle provides the symbolic authorization for disruption along with the concept of a God from which to construct a new political order. Thinking miracle through Schmitt and Badiou provides a theoretical framework for the authorization of radical theo-politics.

**MIRACLES AND MILITANTS**

The concept of miracle, when read through Badiou’s framework, elucidates the evental manner by which religious militancy may erode the State. Pursuing miracle through Schmitt’s concept of sovereignty confers authority on Badiou’s politics and demonstrates the ways in which it may enact something new. As Schmitt scholar Tracy Strong puts it, “Sovereignty [is]… the locus and nature of the agency that constitutes a political system”\(^{47}\) By infusing the event with the symbolic imagery of a transcendent and intervening ‘One,’ the theo-political militant possesses a fecund identity to assemble a society. Allowing the concept of miracle within Badiou’s system transforms his militant into an authorized insurgent, commissioned by the event to suspend the existing orders and enact a

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\(^{43}\) Badiou, *Being and Event,* 42.

\(^{44}\) Feltman, Translator’s Preface in *Being and Event,* xxx. See also Badiou, *Being and Event,* 42, 69.

\(^{45}\) Schmitt, *Political Theology,* 47.

\(^{46}\) Ibid.

new law. This immanent occurrence may be excessive and irreducible, but it is not ‘void.’ It’s very definition as miracle reveals the identity of a sovereign ‘One.’ This locus of identity allows for the constitution of new worlds that can be demonstrated by manner of a few religious revolutionaries.

We have already touched on Paul, but let us return to him briefly. Richard Horsely’s collection of essays Paul and Empire argues that Paul leveraged the language of the Roman imperial cult to cast his gospel as an opposing politics to Caesar’s. The antagonistic moment pitting the two evangelion against one other is the death and resurrection of Jesus. Neil Elliot, writing alongside of Horsely, states, “It is the resurrection… that reveals the imminent defeat of the Powers, pointing forward to the final triumph of God.”48 The event marked a termination of the situational authority and authorized Paul to construct ekklesia. These small local gatherings formed an alternative society transcending the boundaries of empire. Struggling to imagine the consequences of the event within the here and now, the ekklesia resolved disputes outside of local courts, substituted imperial feasts with a ritualized communal meal, and experimented with egalitarian economic relations. This included a collection for fellow assemblies worldwide.49

Or consider the transformation of a respected Arab businessman into a persecuted prophet and military commander. One moment catalyzed a break between an up-and-coming socialite and the economic and political milieu of Mecca. The sudden command, ‘Recite,’50 received by Muhammad during a retreat on Mount Hira, marks the central miracle of the Islamic tradition. The revelation of a singular ‘Lord of the worlds’ sounded an alarm among the Meccan elite in the throes of an economically viable polytheism, urbanization, and social stratification.51 Muhammad and his burgeoning band of converts were soon subjected to significant persecution and forced to flee to Medina.

The reestablishment of the Muslim community in the Northern oasis of Medina demonstrates Muhammad’s inventive genius, creating political concord and military power from his miraculous revelation. The series of pacts, known as the Medina Accords, one of the earliest, most authentic sources of emerging Islam, records Muhammad’s arbitration over a fragmentary settlement on the brink of civil war. In this document, Muhammad draws up pacts between his refugee Meccan followers and the various local, feuding clans.52 The primary concern of the document is to establish boundaries of security and to organize the frenetic tribal groups. Muhammad accomplishes this by subjugating all factions into a localized universal umma. While this umma recognizes differences, including the

51 Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path, 5.
powerful Jewish communities living in Medina, all are incorporated and subjected by the ‘One’ of his revelation. As he writes in the charter, “Whatever manner of dispute among you should be brought before God, great and glorious, and Muhammad” (Article 13 and 22.2).53 Within six short years the Medina coalition had grown strong enough to broker a peace treaty with Mecca. Two years later Muhammad marshaled an army and conquered his former persecutors without resistance.

Or lastly, consider the French theologian John Calvin. Michael Waltzer argues in The Revolution of the Saints that revolution as an organized political phenomenon parallels the rise of the modern State in the sixteenth- and seventeenth-centuries.54 The destruction of the old orders of power in Switzerland, the Dutch Netherlands, Scotland, and England can be credited to groups of radicals who found the grounding for their independent action in Calvinist ideology. Calvin, who Waltzer describes as an “inexhaustible source of sedition and rebellion,” was a politically pragmatic man of action, unconcerned with divine speculation, emotional mysticism, or invisible kingdoms of heaven. Calvin was convinced that a politics must be a this-worldly endeavor. As Calvin put it, “Providence consists in action.”55 It involved organization, legislation, and warfare.56 Waltzer writes, “This same omnipotent and everactive God could at will violate the patterns of nature and at his command his saints might do the same.”57

This is why Waltzer credits Calvinism as the revolutionary interruption of the hierarchal Anglican and Aristotelian social order of the sixteenth-century. The ‘harmonious’ inequalities within human society that supposedly mirrored the structure of the universe, demonstrating the necessity of mutual recognition, subordination, and monarchical respect - were suddenly leveled by the Calvinist consciousness.58 The reciprocal relationship between God’s will and individual willingness interrupted the cosmic chain and refashioned history as a product of divine rupture and human action. With a ‘God of fearful shakings and desolations’ upon their conscience, these Calvinist revolutionaries embodied an ideological commitment to, as Max Weber might put it, political asceticism. This ultimately culminated in events such the judicial murder of King Charles I, the English Revolution, and, as Waltzer argues, the ordering of an epoch of chaos and the preparation of the modern political State.59

These three examples illustrate that miracle – that is, the idea that ‘God intervenes in reality’ – possesses the force and trajectory to inspire political insurgency. Miracle infused each of these militants with a conviction of alternate sovereignty that interrupted Roman Empire, the Meccan elite, and the ‘natural’ hierarchy of

55 Ibid., 35
56 Ibid., 28.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid., 10.

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English society. To borrow Badiou’s turn-of-phrase, the impossibility of miracle unburdened reality of all else that was imaginary - in each of these cases, the dominant social orders. And because these miracles exceeded situational knowledges and structures, their declarations had unbounded reach. The intervening God was God for all. Yet, we should not rush to the universal ‘for all’ as quickly as Badiou. It is precisely because miracle is defined, not by arbitrary chance, but by the singularity of an intervening ‘One,’ that these happenings are infused with a generative identity to construct a new society. Paul, greeting the Galatians, writes, “Paul, an apostle, not sent from men, nor through the agency of man, but through Jesus Christ and God the father who raised him from the dead.”\(^6\) Paul’s authorization (an apostle) originates in event (the resurrection) \textit{with} identity (God who raised Jesus from the dead). To finish the proclamation that Badiou only introduces, “There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus.”\(^6\) This can be also been seen in the advent of an ideology that culminated in the Muslim Brotherhood’s victories across the Arab Spring.

**CHAPTER III: CONCLUDING WITH THE CASE OF SAYYID QUTB**

Up until this point we have charted Badiou’s framework of event, politics, and subject, revealing what his system disallows, and radicalized it through the theological concept of miracle. By examining the boundaries of Badiou’s system we have exposed the manner by which he is able to offer a profound politics of demolition, but not the power to create new worlds. In pushing his project farther through miracle, we have authorized his framework by the concept of a sovereign ‘One.’ While Badiou correctly gauges the capacity of miracle (infinite, unbounded), and the quality of miracle (inconsistent, unforeseeable), he ignores the identity of miracle. In returning to \textit{Rebirth of History} and what Badiou fails to count, I enlist an eventual thinker in his own right, Sayyid Qutb, the leading ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood.

This concluding chapter offers the specific case of Sayyid Qutb, the militant apostle of the Muslim Brotherhood. Sayyid Qutb should be chronologically placed at the beginnings of the Brotherhood and not as an active militant in the recent uprisings. Although his Brotherhood has diversified and persisted, culminating in the series of recent victories, Qutb is primarily significant because he, like Badiou, is a theoretician of revolt. In reading Qutb alongside of Badiou’s most political writings, stark similarities emerge, including a framework built upon eventual fidelity and a \textit{sui generis}, subtractive militancy. Qutb’s revolutionary text \textit{Milestones} brings Badiou’s theory dramatically to life in a way that diverges from Badiou’s own four categories of expertise: mathematics, poetry, politics, and love. Further, Qutb’s fidelity to the miracle of the Qur’anic revelation infuses his text with a notion absent from Badiou’s text - sovereignty. This concept of sovereignty grounds Qutb’s denouncement of the Egyptian State and the proposition of new political possibilities. By revealing the clear similarities between Qutb’s and Badiou’s thought, this chapter demonstrates that Badiou’s framework, when radicalized through the concept of miracle, accounts

\(^{60}\) Galatians 1:1.

for a broader spectrum of political disruptions, theorizing the sovereign authorization to inaugurate new worlds.

**Qutb’s Politics**

After the death of founder Hasan al-Banna on February 12, 1949, the Muslim Brotherhood was thrown into an ideological vacuum.\(^6^2\) Left with only trace records of their charismatic leader’s theory, the Brotherhood stood at the brink of incoherence. Many Muslim Brothers attempted to capture al-Banna’s doctrinal trajectory in their own writings, but it was Sayyid Qutb who stepped into this void and gave the movement renewed definition. The symbolic value of his life pitted against the Egyptian State, combined with his lucid writing style, gave the Brothers a hero and a *procedure* to implement an Islamic regime.\(^6^3\) This procedure (*manhaj*) comes to the forefront of Sayyid Qutb’s late prison writings, specifically his work *Milestones* (*Ma‘ālim fi al-Tariq*).

*Milestones* is the seal of Qutb’s life and literary work.\(^6^4\) The book reflects a departure from the secular, nationalist leanings of his youth, and reveals the culmination of a more rigorous Islamic viewpoint developed alongside his political involvement in the 1950s. In this text Qutb rouses his readers by accusing all existing societies, including all Muslim societies, of ignorance (*jahiliyyah*). Qutb then prescribes revolution. His procedure (*manhaj*) for revolt is particularly fascinating, and mirrors Badiou’s eventual framework. In reading Qutb through a bolstered theory of event, politics, and sovereignty, we can recognize Qutb as an enduring example of theo-political militancy.

Qutb, like Badiou, describes societies as being structured by competitive systems. The terms Qutb emphasizes are *nizam* and *manhaj*. *Nizam* can be translated as ‘system,’ ‘order,’ or ‘regime.’\(^6^5\) In light of Badiou, it functions as ‘State.’ It includes the idea of a ‘unified whole,’ or ‘set of connected parts.’\(^6^6\) For Qutb, *nizam* refers to a societal structure, such as the political and economic systems of capitalism and communism. While *nizam* signifies the objective existence of a system within society, *manhaj* is the ideational procedure that creates such a system.\(^6^7\) *Manhaj* could be defined as ‘method,’ ‘program,’ or ‘procedure.’\(^6^8\) Qutb writes:

> Every ‘religion’ is a *manhaj* for life in that it is a doctrinal conception – or more precisely, in that it includes the doctrinal conception and what issues from it in the way of a social system (*nizam ijtimā‘*)… Now, if the *manhaj* that controls the life of the group is of God’s

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\(^6^3\) Ibid., 37.

\(^6^4\) Kepel, “Signposts,” 42.


\(^6^6\) Ibid., 34

\(^6^7\) Ibid., 33.

\(^6^8\) Ibid.

*JCRT* 14.1 (2014)
making – i.e. issuing from a divinely given doctrinal conception – then this group is ‘the religion of God.’ And if the manhaj that controls the life of this group is of the making of the king, or the prince, or the tribe, or the people, the this group is in ‘the religion of the king’ or ‘the religion of the prince’ or ‘the religion of the tribe’ or ‘the religion of the people.’\(^6\)

Here it is important to note that religion is described as synonymous with manhaj, and that this procedure may empower existing regimes as well as construct a new system. Just as Schmitt recognized within every political system a productive symbolic order, Qutb theorizes that it is political religiosity that codifies regimes. The political identity, which Qutb terms ‘the religion of,’ fixes the limit of the group, signaling the count-as-one operation. Like Badiou, Qutb laments that by manner of these procedures, individual identity is reduced to the whim of national chauvinisms, economics, and race relations.\(^7\)

Qutb demonstrates that these structures are ultimately vulnerable to rupture through his innovative use of the term jahiliyyah. Jahiliyyah is commonly translated ‘the age of ignorance, or barbarism,’ and arises from the Qur’anic description of pre-Islamic Arabia.\(^8\) In its Qur’anic appearances, the term does not indicate an innocent lack of knowledge, but a voracious, systemic ignorance. Qutb’s takes the term designating a historical epoch and applies it to all contemporary societies. By Qutb’s measure, “All societies existing in the world today are jahiliyyah.”\(^9\) He continues, “Jahiliyyah is based on rebellion against God’s sovereignty on earth. It transfers to man one of the greatest attributes of God, namely sovereignty, and makes some men lords over others.”\(^10\) As noted above, Qutb argues that all societies are governed by an operational function (manhaj) that confers sovereign power upon the system. This ideational procedure vigorously strives to preserve its credibility. Anticipating Badiou’s theorem: “The State pursues the integrity of the one-effect,”\(^11\) Qutb writes:

\begin{quote}
Jahiliyyah is not an abstract theory... It always takes the form of a living movement....It is an organized society... there is a close cooperation and loyalty between its individuals and it is always ready and alive to defend its existence consciously or unconsciously. It crushes all elements which seem to be dangerous to its personality.\(^12\)
\end{quote}

Qutb’s trans-historical use of jahiliyyah levels a dramatic judgment against every regime. This judgment, in toto, lays the foundation for a theory of evental rupture. Because every State is governed by a self-preserving system, what

\(^{6}\) Ibid., 35. Quoting Qutb.


\(^{9}\) Qutb, Milestones, 80.

\(^{10}\) Ibid., 11.

\(^{11}\) Badiou, Being and Event, 109.

\(^{12}\) Qutb, Milestones, 46.
Badiou calls the count-as-one, it is permeable for disruption by a non-term. In the same way that Muhammad’s recitation eventually burst upon pre-Islamic Arabia, Qutb proclaims the miracle of the Qur’an as the sole point of departure for rupturing every jahiliyyah system.

Qutb’s entire politics is built around reorienting his readers to the Qur’anic event. Qutb writes, “Without a doubt, we possess this new thing which is perfect to the highest degree, a thing which mankind does not know about and is not capable of producing.”76 This ‘new thing’ is the Qur’anic revelation given to the first Islamic generation. Qutb rejects the possibility that the early Islamic community can be accounted for as merely a moral, social, or economic movement. It was pure event. Qutb continues, “[The Qur’an] took the form of a direct confrontation, with the determination to rend the curtains which had fallen on the hearts and minds of people and to break into pieces all the walls which were standing between man and the truth.”77 Qutb goes on to argue that even Muhammad himself was, to borrow Badiou’s words, an inessential ‘fragment’ suspended by this evental vector.78

The gradual manner in which the Qur’an was revealed demonstrates for Qutb a inventive, localized confrontation with the Meccan and Medinan States.79 Qutb argues that God intentionally withheld the laws and regulations needed for Medina until the early Islamic community actually encountered Medina. God does not reveal ‘ready-made’ systems, Qutb writes, “Islam is more practical than this and has more foresight; it does not find solutions to hypothetical problems.”80 Amidst the circumstantial realities of life, revelation enacted its consequences through militant action. It was a politics—there, a sui generis response.

This evental, subjective response Qutb calls the divine manhaj. As stated previously, manhaj is the ideational procedure that generates human society. Qutb explicitly fixes his divine procedure to the birth of Islam. The miracle of the Qur’an and the contextual manner in which it was revealed is the inception of revolt against every jahiliyyah State. The nascent community in Mecca, the initial persecution, the journey to Medina, and the subsequent return to Mecca all become Qutb’s prescription for social change. Small vanguards (tali’a) respond to the Qur’an as miracle, reordering their communal life around its revelation. This results in conversions and persecution. Ultimately, like Muhammad returning to Mecca, these believing communities confront jahiliyyah society in open struggle and transform it.81 Qutb argues that this would culminate in the dissolution of chauvinistic and nationalistic identities and the beginnings of egalitarian relations under one God. He announces, “Islam is a universal declaration of the freedom of man on earth from every authority except God’s authority.”82

76 Qutb, Milestones, 11.
77 Ibid., 37.
78 Ibid., 15.
79 Ibid., 32.
80 Ibid., 34. My emphasis.
81 Shepard, “Islam as a ‘System,’ in the Later Writings of Sayyid Qutb,” 33.
82 Qutb, Milestones, 69.
Qutb, like Badiou, recognizes that change begins, not in dialectical reversal, but dramatic rupture. It is unanticipated. He writes, “[The miracle] comes into existence from God’s will, it is not expected by any human being or taken into consideration by anyone, and in the beginning, no human endeavor enters into it.”\textsuperscript{83} Further, Qutb’s politics, like Badiou’s, is evacuated from the situational structure. The revelation of one God amidst the pantheon of polytheisms and misallocation of sovereignties opens up a new, universal truth. Qutb’s ‘vanguard’ forces are propelled by this truth, faithfully persisting its consequences within the ‘here and now.’ This militant fidelity becomes Qutb’s sole method for political transformation.

The central difference between Qutb’s manhaj and Badiou’s politics is that Qutb’s manhaj is defined by divine disruption. Qutb writes, “The initial impetus for the movement... comes from outside the earth and outside the human sphere.”\textsuperscript{84} The miracle possesses an identity (one God, “He is the Real Sovereign”) that vies for position against the ideational procedure governing the State.\textsuperscript{85} This identity does not simply dissolve its competitors; it moves to seize power. Qutb writes:

They knew very well that the proclamation, “there is no deity except Allah,” was a challenge to that worldly authority which had usurped the greatest attribute of God, namely sovereignty. It...was a declaration of war.\textsuperscript{86}

The assertion of an intervening ‘One’ declares war on all national, geographic, and economic ideologies, while issuing a new, universal proclamation. This miraculous beginning marks the injection of a concurrently disruptive \textit{and} constructive ideational procedure. The authority latent within this idea eclipses the State and inaugurates a new identity to mediate human relationship. There is some-’One’ to fight for. In Qutb’s own words, “The religion of God is not vague and His manhaj for life is not formless.”\textsuperscript{87} That is to say, it is not ‘void.’

Examining Sayyid Qutb in light of a bolstered theory of event, politics, and sovereignty demonstrates the force and efficacy of theo-political militancy. Qutb’s recalcitrant \textit{Milestones} deposes all States by re-orientating his readers to the evental occurrence of the Qur’an. Suspended between that foundational event and the subject’s immediate localization enacts a militant fidelity to the universal authority of God. This injection of an alternate manhaj works against the dominant social ideology, what Qutb called ‘the religion of the State,’ by asserting a new sovereign. This intervention of sovereignty announces the termination of the old order while organizing and compelling the creation of the new.

Although Qutb was executed as a conspirator against the State, his theoretical framework has persisted, outlasting bans, policing, and torture. Olivier Roy,

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., 102.
\textsuperscript{84} Qutb, \textit{Milestones}, 102.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., 47.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., 25.
\textsuperscript{87} Shepard, “Islam as a ‘System’ in the Later Writings of Sayyid Qutb,” 38. Quoting Qutb.
scholar of globalized Islam, points out that Qutb’s revolutionary texts continue to exert significant influence over contemporary Islamic militants. Further, the Muslim Brotherhood, into which Qutb stepped at a moment of near-incoherence, has diversified and multiplied, exceeding Egyptian borders and the recent expectations of Western pundits. And as the recent ‘spring’ of revolution has demonstrated, the Egyptian State that once struck to eliminate the Society suddenly became overrun by a Brotherhood majority.

**CONCLUSION**

The force of religious insurgency has become the unsettling banality of daily headlines. Acts by religio-political collectives and the formation of faith-fused, genre-bending governments increasingly drive the experts of Western liberalism to confess – as Hillary Clinton did regarding the Brotherhood victory – a certain ignorance. Concerning this daunting resurgence of monotheist militancy, religious theorist Carl Raschke writes, “Something else is coming, but is not yet visible on the horizon. It remains, as the French say, a je ne se quoi, and an I know not what.” Although this impulse’s end is hidden beyond the horizon, its origin can be pinpointed within the theological concept of miracle. Miracle gives this impulse the capacity to exceed national boundaries and the authorization to revolt.

The enduring genius of Badiou is, as he puts it, the optimistic conviction that “the space of the possible is larger than the one we are assigned.” Being faithful to his spirit, this essay has pushed Badiou’s project beyond its own categorical limits, narrative arc of history, and mathematical multiplicity through the concept of an intervening ‘One.” Badiou waxes poetic about ‘the void’ touching upon a “sacred region, rivaling the theologians,” yet ultimately a ‘voided’ politics lacks identity to empower authorization and imagination. In reading Badiou through Schmitt, and through miracle, the theo-political militant becomes clear as the replication of divine interruption. Reviving Cicero’s statement from *De re publica*, we might say, “There is really no human activity in which human *virtus* approaches more closely the divine power of the gods than the founding of new states.” The divine, “Let there be!” becomes the inauguration for action and the identity for creating new worlds.

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91 Ibid.
92 Badiou, *Being and Event*, 69.
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