God, the Gift, and Postmodernism

It is a special irony, perhaps even a contradiction, that the differences between Derrida and Marion have so often been pitted in the form of a contest, or as a matter of agreement and disagreement. It is even more of an irony when one considers the matter of dispute’namely, “negative theology,” whether there is such a thing, and if so, how it might best be named, which is certainly not to say most understood. For with “negative theology,” as both Derrida and Marion will attest, perhaps belatedly but no less assuredly, one passes beyond all forms of predication, whether in the affirmative or negative, and instead, passes into a form of discourse that is “purely pragmatic.”[^3] Such a pragmatic discourse, according to Marion, operates with “no ground, no essence, no presence” (“On the Name,” 37). If such is the case, it follows that there is little or no ground for correction, but rather a constant negotiation of tastes refined and confirmed, of the metaphorics of prayer and praise, and, most importantly in this case, of a theo-logic which is neither apologetic, dogmatic, nor skeptical. A purely pragmatic discourse, in other words, which offers no assurances. With nothing stable and secure, however, it makes deciphering differences especially difficult. Such indecipherability, I might add, leaves the lengthy and highly specialized conversation between the one (Derrida), who as Caputo reminds us, “rightly passes for an atheist” (“Introduction,” 1), and the other (Marion), who is most certainly the most radical of all orthodox theologians, especially in need of clarification. ↩︎

As for the source of this needed clarification, the credit lies first with Caputo, who not only was the orchestrator and chief moderator of the conference, but also, in both the introduction to the text and in a later essay of his own, did the most to bring these two thinkers together. This bringing together should not be taken too literally, as if Caputo somehow resolves what amounts to significant differences between the one and the other. On the contrary, Caputo does his scholarly best to specify and highlight differences. This is accomplished first by Caputo’s continued effort, which began most prominently in his recent work, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion,[^4] to counteract the prevailing myth of Derrida’which is, specifically, that as the progenitor of deconstruction, Derrida must therefore be against religion. Caputo makes the case, in contrast, that Derrida is in fact impassioned by religion, and that it is precisely this religious passion that is the neglected secret, which has caused Derrida to be read less and less well throughout the years. To the extent that Caputo is correct in his reading of Derrida, this forces a reevaluation of the differences between Derrida and Marion. Put simply, it is not that the one is the enemy and the other the defender of religion. On the contrary, it might instead be the case that the severest critique is, and always has been, in service to faith, and that a faith that begins too sure of itself is left open to a critique it cannot withstand. Thus, because the matter is not a choice between religion or not, the question is left open concerning who’Derrida, Marion, or someone entirely different’might best be suited to speak of and for religion in the spirit of postmodernism. ↩︎

Second, Caputo circles in on what he considers to be the most significant point of disagreement between the two thinkers, which traces back to the basic distinction from Husserl “between ‘intention’ (meaning, signification) and ‘fulfillment’ (givenness)” (“Introduction,” 6). Both Derrida and Marion agree that there is an inevitable disjunction between the one and the other, and that this disjunction is the key to understanding Husserl’s inability to deliver on his dream of achieving phenomenology as a rigorous science.^[1] With Derrida, what this disjunction means, or at least that to which he gives the most emphasis, is that in the play of language, there is intention without fulfillment. Thus, according to Derrida’s interpretation, thought is freed to think the impossible. With Marion, on the other hand, there is an overflow of givenness, which means that intention cannot contain fulfillment, or that there is fulfillment without intention. Thus, it is not that one thinks the impossible, but rather that the impossible gives rise to thought. In other words, between Derrida and Marion the order of exchange is reversed. Derrida moves from an epistemological statement of fact (e.g., the epistemological structure of unknowing, the structure of diff’rance itself) to an ontological expectancy. Marion moves from the ontological priority of the gift to an epistemological indeterminacy. Indeed, Caputo makes a compelling case that both are rightly considered “apostles of the impossible,” but it makes a difference how the impossible is imagined, whether as a striving or as the ground of impossibility. Caputo writes: ↩︎